As Canadian policymakers grapple with revenue needs, fairness concerns, and compliance challenges, sales tax was addressed five times in the 2025 federal budget. This article examines one of the key sales tax topics mentioned in the 2025 federal budget, and the broader policy considerations that shape Canada’s future, namely, Canada’s marginal effective tax rate (METR) and the true competitiveness of Canada when it’s METR is the lowest in the G7, as claimed in the budget. Let us first, however, examine the historical sequential fiscal actions and events that brought Canada to the current economic status-quo.
1. What made Canada’s economy to be as it is today?
The end of the World War II marked a defining transition for what people now call “capitalist economies.” Nations emerged from the conflict carrying unprecedented public debt, facing massive reconstruction demands, and confronting fundamentally altered political and economic realities. Over the next fifty years, the role of the state, the design of tax systems, and the model of economic governance underwent sweeping transformations. By the 1990s, these shifts culminated in widespread privatization and almost the global adoption of modern consumption taxes such as the goods and services tax (GST) and the value-added tax (VAT). Let’s go through this historical process phase by phase.
1.1. Post-war debt and state intervention
At the end of World War II, Canada, along with the United States, the United Kingdom, and Western European countries, carried unprecedented national debt. Military production, wartime borrowing, and the collapse of private-sector investment had forced the Canadian government to take the lead in economic management. In 1945, the Canadian debt-to-GDP ratio was at 109% (Brethour 2020), while the U.S. debt-to-GDP ratio peaked at over 100% (Federal Rserve Bank of St. Louis 2025). Similar patterns existed in France, UK, and Australia.
Rather than immediately cutting spending, the Canadian government used active fiscal policy to stabilize the economy, build infrastructure, and fund social programs. Major initiatives by the Canadian government at the time included social welfare programs (e.g. National Health Insurance Program, and Canada Pension Plan (CPP)), infrastructure development, and widespread housing construction.
At the time, the Canadian liberal government pursued a policy marked by a focus on the expansion of the private sector and its integration with the United States economy, rather than a surge of nationalization like the UK, Australia, or France. The Canadian government sold off assets and applied Keynesian economic principles to create jobs and stimulate demand. Industries with government involvement included transportation, communication, energy and natural resources, and infrastructure.
Economic growth during the post-war boom (1945–1973) helped Canada slowly reduce debt ratios through rising GDP rather than austerity. During these decades, Canada, and many capitalist economies, functioned as mixed systems: private enterprise remained robust, while the state owned or regulated key sectors. State ownership of many sectors kept the cost of essential factors of production relatively low, ensuring affordability, economic stability, competitive worldwide product prices, and premium quality products in many industries.
1.2. From public ownership to privatization
Ill-advised on governments’ inefficiencies, however, privatization became a central policy tool in the commonwealth countries and USA. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, for example, sold off airlines, utilities, and resource corporations. The primary period of large-scale privatization in Canada began in the mid-1980s under Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, influenced by the “neoliberal economic policies”. Major entities privatized during this later era included Air Canada, Petro-Canada (initiated under Mulroney, completed later), Canadian National Railways (CN), de Havilland Aircraft Co., and Canadair.
The United Kingdom, under Margaret Thatcher, privatized almost everything: telecoms, energy, airlines, and rail services. The United States, under Ronald Reagan, deregulated the finance sector, transportation, and telecommunications.
It was politically framed, backed with economic theory, to use privatization to eliminate government inefficiencies, reduce fiscal deficits, pay down debt, and promote market efficiency. The shift marked a significant ideological departure from post-war state-led economic management. This new economic model in the 1970s was labeled neoliberal economic philosophy, which promoted deregulation, reduced public spending, and privatization. While privatization increased prices of factors of production, it also drained governments’ sources of revenues. The end-result was indebted governments with no assets and with no sources of revenues, with exception to taxation emerging as the only remaining tool for governments to maintain public services and their commitment to welfare.
1.3. The rise and strain of income taxation
Income tax became the backbone of modern capitalist tax systems after the fact that governments had sold all their assets. High-income taxation funded universal healthcare, pensions, unemployment benefits, and other social programs. This, nonetheless, had exhausted the traditional private sector, i.e. the businesses that were never owned by the government, and triggered the mounting pressure on the middle class.
In the 1970s, however, critics argued that high income tax rates reduced investment incentives. This drove significant “reforms” including lower marginal tax rates and reduced corporate tax burdens. Consequently, by the 1980s and 1990s, many capitalist economies faced budget pressures. Other factors such as aging populations, rising healthcare costs, tax evasion, and attempting to maintain the same welfare level, had contributed to budget pressures. Clearly, while reluctant to print money with no actual GDP increase, governments had no other sources of revenues other than taxation, and while insisting on maintaining their spending level to protect their national welfare level, the “reforms” were not enough; a new stream of revenue must be “invented”.
1.4. The invention of modern sales tax
One of the worst humanity inventions came into existence in the late 80s and early 90s and was named “value-added” tax. While classically governments taxed alcohol or tobacco products to deter their consumption, the 80s and 90s governments have decided to tax every productive economic activity: sales. This was parallel to injecting a virus at every economic transaction of an already troubled western economies. Economists commonly describe the virus as the tax deadweight loss, defined as the economic inefficiency caused by a tax. Sales taxes decrease the quantity of a commodity traded because they raise its price for consumers, causing some mutually beneficial transactions to no longer occur. The magnitude of the deadweight loss is determined by the price elasticity of demand and supply: the more elastic the curves, the larger the deadweight loss.
Some key milestones for this invention in the commonwealth countries included:
- Canada (1991): Introduced GST, replacing the hidden Manufacturer’s Sales Tax.
- Australia (2000): Introduced GST after long debate.
- New Zealand (1986): Introduced one of the world’s first modern GST systems.
By the 1990s, sales taxes had become a standard feature of capitalist taxation, helping governments create revenue after giving up their revenue generating assets to the private sector. The below chart shows the historical snapshot evolution of capitalist economies and their fiscal policies that led to the introduction of “value-added” taxes in the late 80s and early 90s of the last century.
– Figure 1. How “value-added” tax was born. Source: The Dominion Audit Corporation. ©2025. –
2. Critics on the 2025 federal budget comments on Canada’s marginal effective tax rate
Now that it is generally established how the current budgetary challenges facing the current Canadian government were created, let us examine one of its statements on sales tax in the 2025 Federal Budget. The new Canadian government has highlighted the 2025 Federal Budget with pride that “Budget 2025 reinforces Canada as the country with the lowest marginal effective tax rate in the G7” (Government of Canada 2025) and emphasized that Canada’s METR is “lower […] than the U.S.” (Government of Canada 2025). It attributes this advantage to Canada’s federally administered GST/HST system, as opposed to the state-level retail sales tax (RST) structure in the United States. Because Canada’s “value-added” tax structure avoids taxing business inputs, the overall tax burden on investment and production is lowered, and, therefore, Canada’s METR is lower than U.S.’s. Even though the U.S. states use RST, which applies only at the final consumer purchase, many U.S. states' RST still applies to some business inputs because the system is less consistent and does not offer universal input exemptions. This effectively increases the tax cost of doing business and raises the METR.
What the government’s analysis in the budget overlooked, however, was a fundamental principle of tax efficiency: a METR is maximized when the marginal benefit of a tax equals its marginal cost. Because the GST/HST imposes a pure cost on consumers—yielding no direct benefit to them while generating deadweight loss for the broader economy—its marginal cost will always exceed its marginal benefit. Consequently, the GST/HST can only achieve a maximized METR when its rate is reduced to 0%. Therefore, even when Canada’s METR is the lowest in the G7, it is not doing the Canadian economy any benefit.
As Canada positions itself as the G7 leader in METR competitiveness, Budget 2025 frames the GST/HST-based METR advantage as proof of a more efficient, investment-friendly tax structure. Yet the broader historical and economic context tells a more complex story—one shaped by decades of privatization, rising government dependence on taxation as the only left source of revenue, and the structural inefficiencies embedded within modern consumption taxes. While a low METR may signal a relative competitiveness, it does not erase the deadweight loss imposed by the value-added taxation, nor does it resolve the long-term revenue sustainability challenge facing Canada’s economic model. True competitiveness requires more than favorable METR: it demands an honest reassessment of the tax architecture, its economic consequences, and the policy assumptions that have guided Canada from the post-war era to the present. In this light, Budget 2025’s METR claims should be seen not as a final verdict on Canada’s economic strength, but as an invitation to question whether the system producing these numbers genuinely promotes prosperity—or merely measures around deeper structural burdens.
Works Cited
Brethour, Patrick. 2020. "How Canada Won Its First Debt War." The Globe And The Mail. Accessed 12 09, 2025. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-how-canada-won-its-first-debt-war/.
Federal Rserve Bank of St. Louis. 2025. Gross Federal Debt as Percent of Gross Domestic Product. Annual, U.S. Office of Management and Budget, St. Louis, MO: Federal Rserve Bank of St. Louis. Accessed December 2, 2025. https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GFDGDPA188S.
Government of Canada. 2025. Canada Strong Budget 2025. Department of Finance Canada, Department of Finance Canada. Accessed 11 09, 2025. https://budget.canada.ca/2025/report-rapport/pdf/budget-2025.pdf.
Office for Budget Responsibility. 2013. Post-World War II debt reduction. Fiscal Sustainability Report, London: Post-World War II debt reduction. Accessed December 2, 2025. https://obr.uk/box/post-world-war-ii-debt-reduction/.